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11 Liberalization of Capital 
Flows in Korea: Big Bang 
or Gradualism? 
Dongchul Cho and Youngsun Koh 
11.1 Introduction 
Economic liberalization and deregulation has become a general trend in the 
era of globalization. The Korean economy is no exception to this trend. Despite 
the miraculous performances under the government-led growth strategy, Korea 
began to terminate some regulatory policies in the 1980s and accelerated the 
liberalization process in the 1990s. With respect to external sectors of the econ- 
omy, the Korean government introduced a market-based exchange rate system 
in 1990 and began to open the official capital markets in 1992 by partially 
allowing foreigners to invest directly in Korean stock markets. Since then, the 
process of capital market deregulation has become irreversible. The only re- 
maining matter seems to be how quickly the liberalization process will, or 
should, be carried out. 
With the current level of interest rate differentials between Korea and devel- 
oped economies, drastic full-scale liberalization would certainly induce a large 
amount of capital inflow and appreciate the Korean won. This would affect the 
price competitiveness of Korean products in international markets, which 
could bring about significant macroinstability in an economy like Korea’s, 
which relies heavily on external transactions. An urgent question among Ko- 
rean policymakers is whether there exists any policy combination that could 
minimize the macroinstability associated with the unavoidable trend of capital 
market liberalization. 
This paper attempts to provide some quantitative, though very crude, assess- 
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ments of several alternative policy choices. In order to perform simulation ex- 
ercises, we set up a structural macromodel based on neoclassical long-run con- 
vergence and Keynesian short-run dynamics. Since the economic environment 
of the future, particularly in relation to external capital transactions and ex- 
change rate determination, will be completely different from that of the past, 
there are undoubtedly limitations to what we can learn from past data.’ For 
this reason, we employ theoretical relationships rather than only utilizing re- 
gression results for some parts of the model. 
We do not believe that the exercises performed in this paper can significantly 
improve general understanding of this rather well-known subject; the simula- 
tion results are qualitatively predictable. By applying general theories to the 
specific data, however, the quantitative results in the paper may help readers to 
anticipate future dynamic paths of the key macrovariables in the Korean econ- 
omy. In addition, the paper provides evidence for the convergence of the neo- 
classical growth model from the Korean data, to which the simulation model 
anchors. 
Section 11.2 reviews recent developments in the exchange rate system and 
capital market liberalization in Korea as well as the movements of some rele- 
vant macrovariables. Section 11.3 briefly explains the econometric macro- 
model used in this paper, and section 11.4 presents the simulation results. Sec- 
tion 11.5 provides concluding remarks. 
11.2 Capital Flows and Related Macrovariables in Korea 
11.2.1 Exchange Rate System 
With the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system in 1980, the ex- 
change rate began to float by being pegged to a basket of multiple foreign ex- 
change rates. Nevertheless, the government continued to exercise great discre- 
tionary power in the name of “policy considerations,” the most important of 
which seemed to be maintenance of the current account balance.2 
It was recognized, however, that operation with the exchange rate as an inde- 
pendent policy tool would not be possible since Korea’s capital markets would 
no longer be insulated from the gigantic world capital market. To prepare for 
the forthcoming capital account liberalization process, the multiple basket peg 
system was finally replaced, in March 1990, with the “market average rate” 
system. Under the new system, the exchange rate is determined by demand for 
and supply of Korean won vis-2-vis foreign exchange, and the government can 
affect the exchange rate only indirectly through the market. Although the Ko- 
rean government still appears to be a major player in the exchange market for 
1. As a leading example, one can think of Lucas’s critique (1976). 
2. For details of Korea’s exchange rate movements, see Oum and Cho (1995). 
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the Korean won, its relative market power will certainly diminish as the Korean 
capital market becomes integrated with the world market. 
11.2.2 Capital Market Liberalization to Date 
In Korea, capital market liberalization proceeded gradually, taking into ac- 
count such factors as the current account balance, money supply, and exchange 
rate. For example, when the current account showed large deficits in the first 
half of the 1980s (see fig. 11.1), capital outflows were strictly restricted to slow 
down the pace of foreign debt accumulation. This situation was completely 
reversed in the latter half of the 1980s. A large current account surplus, reach- 
ing 7.8 percent of GDP in 1988, forced the Korean government to decontrol 
capital outflows. As a result, the net level of foreign debt plunged from 37.7 
percent of GDP in 1985 to 1.4 percent in 1989. But the increased capital out- 
flows were insufficient to contain the growth of reserve money (see fig. 11.2). 
Hence, private credits were restricted, and massive sterilization was conducted 
through monetary stabilization bonds (MSBS).~ 
However, controls on capital flows became increasingly difficult as the Ko- 
rean economy got more integrated into the global economy. Foreign investors, 
as well as domestic companies, constantly demanded greater opening of Ko- 
rean markets to exploit the big interest differential with overseas markets. To 
meet their demands to a certain degree, a capital account liberalization plan 
was finally announced in 1993.4 
Korean residents now have a great deal of freedom as far as capital outflows 
are ~oncerned,~ but considerable restrictions still remain on capital inflows.6 
These restrictions on capital inflows are not expected to be removed in the near 
future unless the interest rate differential substantially narrows. 
11.2.3 Capital Flows and the Interest Rate Differential 
Since external capital flows were tightly controlled in Korea, the capital ac- 
count balance was extremely insensitive to the uncovered interest differential.' 
3. The outstanding MSBs amounted to 88 percent of reserve money at the end of 1995. 
4. This plan was superseded by the foreign exchange reform plan in 1994, which in turn was 
revised in late 1995. Further liberalization was announced in April 1996. For a survey of Korea's 
liberalization process, see Park (1992). 
5. Individuals, as well as institutional investors, can make unlimited investments in overseas 
securities. Institutional investors can hold deposits in foreign banks up to $100 million, while 
lower limits apply to legal entities and individuals. Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
to be completely liberalized by 1997. 
6.  The regulations are as follows: nonresidents as a whole can hold up to 20 percent of the 
outstanding shares of each company, and each nonresident up to 5 percent; bond holding by non- 
residents is allowed indirectly through the Korea Trust and Country Fund; direct holding is allowed 
only for convertible bonds issued by small and medium-sized enterprises; domestic companies can 
use foreign commercial loans within certain limits only for the import of capital goods and for 
FDI; delayed payment for imports is currently permitted for up to 120 days. 
7. Since futures or forward markets are not yet established in Korea, we could not test covered 
interest panty. 
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Table 11.1 Capital Flows and the Uncovered Interest Rate Differential 
i, - i: - log (e,+,/e,) 
Capital Constant 
Account Balance (X 10-2) No Time Trend t -  1995 RZ 
skb, 
Ikb, 
kb, 
skb, 
lkb, 
kb, 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
1.26 
(2.83) 
1.23 
(2.38) 
-0.13 
(0.54) 
0.88 
(2.15) 
0.76 
( 1.63) 
0.04 
(1.81) 
-0.11 
(2.63) 
-0.07 
(1.47) 
0.09 
(2.45) 
0.09 
(1.33) 
0.18 
(2.39) 
.06 
.12 
.04 
0.01 .I1 
(1.69) 
0.04 .32 
(3.76) 
0.04 .29 
(4.14) 
Notes: skb,, Ikb,, and kb, denote short-term, long-term, and total capital account balance (normal- 
ized by potential GDP), respectively; and i,, if, and e, denote domestic interest rate (yield rate of 
three-year corporate bond), foreign interest rate (three-month Eurodollar rate), and won-dollar 
exchange rate, respectively. The sample period is 1983:l to 1995:4. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics. The linear time trend, t - 1995, is normalized so that f = 1995 yields 0. For further 
details. see the text. 
Using the actual rate of the won-dollar exchange rate depreciation as a proxy 
variable for the expected rate, log(e,+,/e,), table 1 1.1 shows the results of regres- 
sions of the capital account balance (normalized by potential GDP), kb,, on 
i, - if - log(e,+,/e,), where i, and z: denote the domestic and foreign interest 
rates at time t, respectively. If capital were perfectly mobile across national 
borders and there were no uncertainty, this coefficient would in principle ap- 
proach infinity so that only the exchange rate can, and should, adjust to restore 
the equilibrium.* While the short-term capital account (skb,) shows a small but 
significant positive correlation, the long-term capital account (lkb,) yields a 
negative correlation. 
Although the correlations between the capital account and the uncovered 
interest rate differential are not strong, it seems clear that the capital account 
has become more responsive to the interest differential. As a piece of evidence, 
table 11.1 reports the results of regressions in which a linear time trend is 
included in the regression coefficient: the time trend appears significant in both 
skb, and lkb,  regression^.^ In particular, the estimates for the kb, regression 
8. Considering the forecast error about e,,, at time f, there must be measurement error in the 
expected appreciation rate, hence a downward bias in the regression coefficient. Nevertheless, 
there seems no reason to expect that this bias would change the sign of the coefficient estimate, 
and the increase in the coefficient estimate over time seems to indicate that capital flows are getting 
more sensitive to the uncovered interest differential. 
9. We also tried several other specifications for the coefficient to test if there is any convexity 
over time, but the results were not very different from the linear time trend. 
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imply that the coefficient turned positive in 1991, approximately the same time 
that the stock market began to open to foreign investors. 
11.2.4 Secular Trend of the Interest Rate 
The annual yield rate of three-year corporate bonds in Korea is still around 
12 percent, which implies an approximately 7 percent real interest rate, given 
the approximately 5 percent annual inflation rate. Under this circumstance, it 
is clear that for foreign investors, Korea is an attractive market that has not yet 
been sufficiently explored. Then the most relevant question to our analysis in 
this paper is what maintains the high (real) interest rate in Korea and how it 
will evolve over time. 
Figure 11.3 plots three series of interest rates: the official bank loan rate, the 
yield rate of three-year corporate bonds, and the curb market rate, all of which 
are converted into real terms by subtracting the actual inflation rate. It is well 
known that the official interest rates on bank loans and corporate bonds were 
maintained at levels far below the market rate by severe government controls 
in Korea until the first half of the 1980s. Although the gap between the official 
rates and the curb market rate substantially narrowed as a result of the continu- 
ous financial deregulations in the 1980s, the curb market rate seemed to be a 
better measure of the market rate at least until the first half of the 1980s. From 
figure 11.3, it appears clear that the curb market rate has been in a downward 
secular trend, from over 20 percent in the early 1970s to around 7 percent in 
1995. Using the corporate bond rate, which is widely used as the representative 
market rate in the 1990s, we can also find a similar downward trend if the 
sample period is restricted to a recent period, say, 1983-95. 
We interpret this downward trend of the real interest rate as evidence for 
transitional dynamics of the neoclassical growth model. In a stylized neoclassi- 
cal growth model, employing the Cobb-Douglas production function, Y, = A, 
K;L:-", where Y denotes potential output, A level of technology, K capital 
stock, and L labor supply, the interest rate is equated to the marginal productiv- 
ity of capital, aYr/Kr, minus the depreciation rate, 6. In an economy with an 
initial level of K/L lower than the steady state level, the marginal productivity 
of capital (hence the interest rate) declines over time to converge to the steady 
state level (say, the world level of the interest rate). 
In order to be convinced that transitional dynamics was a plausible descrip- 
tion for the secular trend of the Korean interest rate, we also plotted in figure 
11.3 rough estimates of aY,/K, - 6 using (Y = 1/3 and 6 = 0.066 per year," 
which appear to aptly describe the trend of the curb rate. It may be worthwhile 
to note here that the average growth rate of investment has been far greater 
10. The estimates of labor income share, 1 - a, in Korea range from 60 to 70 percent (see table 
2 in Hong 1994) and the depreciation rate of capital, 6, is estimated to be 6.6 percent per year by 
Park (1992). 
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than the average growth rate of GDP in Korea since the 196Os.lL This was the 
main cause of the declining trend of Y,/K,, and it seems unlikely that the trend 
will suddenly reverse its direction. In order to reflect the downward trend in 
the long run, therefore, we include ayr/Kr - 8 in the interest rate specification 
along with other commonly used variables, such as money supply (see the ap- 
pendix for details). 
11.3 A Brief Description of the Empirical Model 
The model we used for the simulations is basically neoclassical in the long 
run, but Keynesian in the short run (details are in the appendix). That is, all 
the real variables are determined by the supply side in the long run, which 
follows the transitional dynamics explained in subsection 11.2.4.12 In the short 
run, however, demand shocks do matter as in a typical Keynesian m0de1.I~ 
Technically, the way we distinguish long-run from short-run phenomena is 
by employing error correction types of specifications in which only long-run 
11. E.g., the average annual growth rate of investment during the period 1970-95 in Korea was 
approximately 12 percent, while that of GDP was around 8 percent. 
12. See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for a discussion of dynamic responses of a flexible price 
model in relation to the capital market opening of an economy with higher interest rates than the 
world rate. We take this case only as a long-run phenomenon because we assume in our model 
that prices are sticky in the short run. 
13. While the long-run neutrality of money holds in the model, superneutrality does not. 
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Table 11.2 Assumptions about Growth Rates of Exogenous Variables (percent) 
Variable Big Bang(e) Gradualism(e) Gradualism(M) 
y: 3.0 
p:  2.5 
i,‘ 1.5 
L: 2.2 
e, 
4 14.0 (1996-2000) 
- 
~ 
13.0 (2001-5) 
13.0 (2001-5) 
~ 
B, 14.0 (1996-2000) 
3 .O 
2.5 
1.5 
2.2 
14.0 (1996-2OOO) 
- 
13.0 (2001-5) 
13.0 (2001-5) 
14.0 (1996-2000) 
3.0 
2.5 
1.5 
2.2 
800 
Note: See the appendix for definitions of the variables. 
determinants are included in the error-correcting terms. That way, the effects 
of all the other short-run (say, stationary) disturbances eventually disappear, 
leaving only the effects of long-run determinants. For example, the interest 
rate is affected by many factors like money supply in the short run, but it will 
eventually converge to the sum of the inflation rate and capital productivity. 
What then becomes important for short-run effects is speeds of convergence 
toward long-run equilibrium levels, which we let the data determine from the 
 regression^.'^ 
We used quarterly data from 1983:l through 1995:4 for the  regression^,'^ 
although the simulation results will be presented in annual terms. For the future 
projection, we took the simplest case of the exogenous variables that are pre- 
sented in table 11.2. Particularly important is the foreign interest rate in real 
terms, which we assumed to be 4 percent throughout the simulation period.I6 
We are aware of the many limitations of our empirical model in particular 
as well as of simulation experiments in general. After all, the shortcomings of 
policy simulations using econometric models have well been recognized since 
Lucas (1976). Our model is also far from flawless. Perhaps the most important 
flaw is that it is basically backward looking. For example, the “expected” rate 
of inflation is simply computed from the past series of the inflation rate, rather 
than going through the rational expectations of monetary policy reactions. Our 
14. In a sense, our model can be viewed as a large vector autoregression system with error- 
correcting terms. To identify the shocks, we tried to minimize the number of two-way causal 
relations among contemporary variables. Nevertheless, a few contemporaneous variables remain 
to cause each other (e.g.. consumption and GDP). We did not attempt to correct possible simultane- 
ity bias, hoping that the size of the bias is negligible. 
15. The major reason that we restricted the sample period to 1983-95 is to take the longest 
period in which the corporate bond rate can be used as the representative interest rate. 
16. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), e.g., report 3 to 4 percent per year as the acceptable range 
of the “world real interest rate.” We took 4 percent to allow a slight margin for country risk, so 
that the capital market will be in balance when the real interest rate in Korea reaches 4 percent. 
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application of forward-looking behavior to determine the exchange rate may 
then be considered inconsistent with the other parts of the model. Nevertheless, 
we hope that the following experiments can provide a useful, though rough, 
quantitative assessment of the effects of capital market liberalization in Korea. 
11.4 Simulation Results 
11.4.1 Benchmark Case: No Capital Flows 
As shown in figure 11.1, Korea has been maintaining a net capital inflow of 
about 2 percent of GDP since 1992. Therefore, an abrupt shutdown of external 
capital markets may be interpreted as a regressive “big bang” case. We experi- 
mented with this case to see how the model works and to obtain benchmark 
values of the relevant variables whose dynamic paths will be compared under 
different regimes. 
In this benchmark case, capital cannot flow freely to seek higher returns, 
and thus interest parity does not hold. Specifically, we let the exchange rate 
adjust to restore the current account balance by e,,, = e, exp(-p cb,), where 
cb, is the current account balance normalized by potential GDP and the param- 
eter for the adjustment speed, p, was estimated from the data. That is, we 
assume that capital account transactions are just passively adjusted to support 
current account transactions. This specification of the exchange rate may be 
interpreted as a policy reaction function that aims at current account balance 
using current account performance as a measure of exchange rate misalign- 
ment, which appears to fit the Korean data in the 1980s.’’ 
Although we will not report the results for this case, we could get a rough 
idea of the real exchange rate that would be consistent with current account 
balance (called the purchasing power parity [PPP] rate hereafter). Given the 
assumptions about all the exogenous variables, this value appears to be around 
800 won per dollar in the beginning of 1996. In addition, we could confirm 
that the real interest rate gradually declines to 4.3 percent in 2005, which is 
mainly generated by the projection of the secular downward trend in the model 
(see the appendix for details). It is also confirmed that the rate of CPI inflation 
converged to around 3 percent under the assumptions for money supply and 
labor growth rate. 
In the following, the discussion will focus on the results of three cases that 
differ in the speed of capital market liberalization and exchange rate policy. 
Table 11.3 summarizes the exchange rate dynamics and associated money sup- 
ply mechanisms for each of the three cases, and figures 11.4A-11.4~5 report the 
simulation results. 
17. In fact, the Korean government appeared to manage the exchange rate aiming at current 
account balance in the 1980s. See Oum and Cho (1995) for details. 
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Table 11.3 Exchange Rate and Money Supply Determination Mechanisms 
Case Exchange Rate (e,) Money Supply (4) 
Big Bang(e) 
Gradualism(e) 
Gradualism(M) e, = 800 
e,,, = e, exp(i, - i!) 
e,,, = e,exp(i, - i: - kb,/[7.5/(2010 - t ) ] }  
M ,  = M, (exogenous) 
M, = a, (exogenous) 
M, = a, + 5 (KB, + CB,) 
Note: We used 5 as the money multiplier in the M ,  specification of gradualism. 
11.4.2 Big Bang 
We regard as “perfect capital mobility” the case in which uncovered interest 
parity holds (or the elasticity of kb, with respect to i, - if - log(e,+,/e,) is 
infinity in table 11.1). In this case, the most active role is assigned to capital 
account transactions concerning the exchange rate determination, and the cur- 
rent account simply responds to exchange rate movements. We assume that 
this new regime of exchange rate dynamics suddenly replaced the old one at 
the beginning of 1996. As will be explained below, the only sustainable policy 
in this case is to let the exchange rate adjust. 
Exchange Rate Adjustment 
in the case of big bang, the exchange rate dynamics can be specified by 
If the government let the exchange rate absorb the interest rate differential 
e,,, = e, exp(i, - i f ) ,  
while the money supply is controlled by the government. In order to pin e, 
down in the simulation, a terminal condition is needed as in other forward- 
looking dynamic models. We tried several values for the initial e, and picked 
the associated dynamic path of e, that yielded the most consistent results with 
the path of i, at the terminal year, 2005. Since i, almost converges to if by 2005 
(6.5 percent = 4 percent real rate + 2.5 percent inflation rate in this case), the 
real exchange rate should also converge to the PPP rate that was roughly calcu- 
lated in the benchmark case. 
A typical sticky-price monetary model (Dornbusch 1976, e.g.) would pre- 
dict the results for this case. The exchange rate initially jumps to appreciate 
by approximately 15 percent18 and then gradually depreciates by the interest 
differential until it converges to the PPP rate around 2005 (fig. 11.4A). The 
interest rate declines faster than in the benchmark case because of more active 
18. This estimate of 15 percent is roughly consistent with the result of simple algebra using the 
interest parity and the long-run trend of the real interest rate without considering feedback effects 
of all the other variables of the macromodel. From the observation that the real interest rate de- 
clines by approximately 0.3 percentage points per year, the cumulative sum of interest differentials 
can be roughly computed by X:zo (r, - r,!) = 15, for r, = 7.0 - 0.3r and r,! = 4.0. 
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investmentI9 and the resulting capital accumulation (fig. 11.4E). Potential out- 
put also increases rapidly (fig. 11.4H), but the economy goes through a short- 
run recession for the first two to three years (fig. 11.4G) due to the contraction 
of foreign demand that is caused by the exchange rate appreciation. Prices, 
particularly PPI, which is far more affected by import prices, become very 
stable (figs. 11.41 and 11.4J). But the current account deficit reaches almost 5 
percent of GDP in 1997 (fig. 11.4K) and then approaches balance, rapidly 
accumulating (net) foreign debt, 15 percent by 1999 (Fig. 11.4L).20 
Exchange Rate Targeting 
Policymakers often fear the rapid accumulation of foreign debt and therefore 
seek exchange rate stability. To see the effects of this policy, we set the nominal 
exchange rate at 800 won per dollar, which appears to be approximately con- 
sistent with the current account balance at the beginning of 1996. Since interest 
parity should hold in this big bang case, the only way to support nominal ex- 
change rate stability (e,,, = e, for all t )  is to equate the domestic interest rate 
with the foreign rate (i, = if for all t).21 
If expansionary monetary policy were used to lower i, to the level of ii, we 
could easily confirm unsustainability: the model explodes no later than 1998 
with more than 100 percent inflation.22 The initial monetary expansion to set 
if = i: brings about inflation, hence if begins to rise, which requires accelerating 
monetary expansion to keep it = if. If the interest rate gap is not so wide and 
the gap is expected to narrow soon due to a third factor, then a temporary 
expansion of the money supply may be a reasonable choice. But Korea’s cur- 
rent situation does not seem to be such a case. To save space, we did not report 
the results of this experiment. 
Another, though arguable, way to lower if may be to run an extremely large 
budget s~rplus.~’ From many regressions of the interest rate on public bonds, 
however, we only found an extremely small and statistically insignificant elas- 
ticity. The interest rate equation in the appendix is the one that yielded the 
largest elasticity with respect to public bonds. Even with this largest elasticity, 
a simple calculation shows that the required amount of outstanding bond re- 
duction to equate i, to if would be 30 to 50 percent of GDP, or two times larger 
than the current level of total government expenditure, which would be impos- 
sible to achieve. 
11.4.3 Gradual Liberalization 
The general consensus of the empirical literature seems that while covered 
interest parity holds, uncovered interest parity does not exactly hold even 
19. More active investment is mostly induced by the relatively low interest rate. 
20. Net foreign debt is simply computed as the accumulation of the current account deficit. 
21. The reason that i, should be equal to i: is that we assumed perfect foresight of investors. 
22. The model explodes no matter where the target level of exchange rate is set. 
23. How sensible this statement is depends on whether Ricardian equivalence holds. 
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among the countries maintaining the most liberalized capital markets.% Con- 
sidering this empirical finding, it may be rather reasonable to assume that the 
elasticity of kb, with respect to i, - i: - log(e,+,/e,) is finite. Particularly for 
the case of Korea, in which the capital markets are expected to open gradually, 
we assume that this elasticity (denotedflt) below) will be increasing at a grad- 
ual pace over time: 
whereflt) > 0 andf’(t) > 0 for all t. One can regard the big bang case as 
the limiting case in whichflt) goes to infinity from the beginning. We have 
experimented with many specifications of At). As can be easily reasoned, the 
general rule of thumb is that the more rapidlyflt) increases, the closer the 
results are to the big bang case: the initial appreciation of the exchange rate is 
larger, or the model is more likely to explode with exchange rate targeting. 
In this paper, we only present the results forflt) = 7.5/(2010 - t), which is 
one of the most gradual processes we have tried, so gradual that exchange rate 
targeting does not explode. The rationale of this specification is that (a) the 
Korean government will completely open capital markets by the year 2010, 
when the Korean interest rate is expected to be sufficiently close to the world 
rate (flt) goes to infinity for t = 2010), and (b)fl1995) = 0.5 is close to the 
actual elasticity in 1995.25 
While this specification is tractable, the most critical question behind this 
gradual process is how sustainable the gradualism itself would be under the 
potential threat of speculative attacks. The assumption that capital flows are 
only partially responsive to the interest rate differential hinges on the presump- 
tion that potential speculators are limited in their amount of foreign currency 
transactions. That is, the big proviso of a successful gradualism appears to be 
the controllability of the quantity of foreign currency inflows until the interest 
rate differential narrows, say, by the year 2000. 
Exchange Rate Adjustment 
This case is basically the same as the case of big bang with exchange rate 
overshooting, except for the magnitudes. The exchange rate determined by 
e,,, = e, exp{i, - 1: - kb,/[7.5/(2010 - t)]} initially jumps to appreciate to a 
relatively mild extent and then depreciates over time until it reaches the PPP 
rate (gradualism(e) in figs. 11.4A and 11.4B). The directions of all the other 
results are the same as in the big bang case, but the magnitudes are smaller. 
Exchange Rate Targeting 
Perhaps a more interesting case of gradual liberalization is the one in which 
the government policy to fix the nominal exchange rate is sustainable. Since 
24. This may be due to either the risk-averse behavior of the investors or the “irrational” formu- 
lation of the agent’s expectations, or something else. See Taylor (1995) for a recent survey. 
25. In 1995, kb, was about 3 percent and the interest differential was about 6 percent. 
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kb, is not only finite but rather insensitive to the interest rate differential, the 
government is given much more room for policy making. 
We fixed the exchange rate at 800 won per dollar, as in subsection 11.4.2, 
and let the central bank accommodate additional money demand to the same 
extent as the overall balance surplus. Since the level of the exchange rate ini- 
tially yields approximately the current account balance (gradualism(M) in fig. 
11.4K), the money supply expands almost as much as the capital account sur- 
plus, which will inevitably generate faster inflation. 
This inflation has opposite effects on the subsequent money supply. On the 
one hand, it raises the nominal interest rate and thus induces more capital in- 
flow, which increases the money supply. On the other hand, the inflation ap- 
preciates the real exchange rate and the current account turns to deficit, which 
decreases the money supply. The relative size of the two effects depends on 
the specification of At), but in the case of very gradual liberalization, At) = 
7.5/(2010 - t), the latter effect dominates and the money supply declines (fig. 
11 .4C).26 The monetary contraction then pushes the economy, which is about 
to enter a recession in 1999 after the boom generated by the initial monetary 
expansion, deeper into recession (fig. 11.4G). The deep recession further de- 
creases the rate of inflation (fig. 11.40), and the nominal interest rate finally 
drops below the world rate in 2001 (fig. 11.4E), which brings about capital 
flight from the country, along with current account surplus starting in 2002 
(fig. 11.4K). While foreign debt accumulates less than in the big bang case 
(fig. 11.4L), the potential level of output is smaller (fig. 11.4H) and the econ- 
omy goes through a similar magnitude of macroinstability in the opposite di- 
rection (fig. 11.4G). 
Under this gradual liberalization plan and the expected downward trend of 
the interest rate, sterilized intervention for exchange rate stability appears to 
be sustainable as well as sensible for macro~tability.~~ In order to avoid the 
initial recession and current account deficit, however, the government should 
bear the burden of public debt. In other words, the external debt that would 
otherwise accumulate is replaced by internal debt of the government (incurring 
higher interest rates). The benefit is gaining macrostability, while the cost is 
forgoing the opportunity to exploit foreign savings to enhance the potential 
capacity of the economy. 
11.5 Conclusion 
We have presented rough estimates of the dynamic paths for important mac- 
rovariables under several different liberalization scenarios. Fully admitting the 
limitations of our experiments, we believe that they can provide more concrete 
ideas of where the economy will be heading for each case. 
26. IfAt) is less gradual, the model explodes as in the case of big bang with exchange rate tar- 
27. As mentioned earlier, the effect of government bonds on the interest rate is negligible. 
geting. 
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Among very many possible combinations of policies, including the speed of 
market opening, we are not able to pick an “optimal” one that totally depends 
on the objective function of policymakers. If the objective is simply to max- 
imize the potential capacity of the economy with price stability, the big bang 
in conjunction with exchange rate overshooting should be recommended. But 
in this case, policymakers have to convince people that a sweet boom will 
arrive after a painful recession for the first couple of years and that the current 
account will turn into surplus after, say, 10 years. 
Perhaps the time horizon here is too long for policymakers, and even when 
based on economic criteria it is not clear whether maximizing the potential 
level at the expense of a recession is the best choice. If it is not, a gradual 
liberalization process can be recommended. A critical justification for gradual- 
ism is then the secular downward trend of the interest rate, and the key to a 
successful gradualism seems to be control over the quantity of foreign currency 
inflows. In any case, we leave completely unanswered the question: how grad- 
ual is “optimal”? 
Appendix 
The Model 
Variables 
A 
B 
C G  
CP 
e 
I 
KB 
K 
L 
M 
MG 
MPK 
MPL 
P‘ 
PP 
P” 
P” 
Pf 
P” 
i 
if 
t 
technical level 
public bond 
government consumption expenditure 
private consumption expenditure 
exchange rate 
gross fixed capital formation 
capital balance 
capital stock 
total labor employed 
money supply (M2) 
imports 
marginal productivity of capital 
marginal productivity of labor 
CPI 
PPI 
unit value index of exports 
unit value index of imports 
foreign WPI 
unit import price of oil 
interest rate 
foreign interest rate 
time trend (quarterly) 
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W wage 
XG exports 
Y GDP 
Yf foreign GDP 
57 CPI inflation rate 
7 tax rate 
An asterisk denotes potential level. A denotes first difference. 
Identities 
Definition of capital stock (annual depreciation rate of 0.066) 
K ,  = (1 - O.066/4)Kf+, + (1/4)(Z, + Z,+, + Zf-2 + Zf-3) 
Trend of labor force (annual growth rate of 0.028) 
L, = exp(0.02837 . t /4  - 46.6687) 
Aggregate production function (capital income share of 1/3) 
YT = A, . K,“3 . L:/3 
Technology progress rate (annual growth rate of 0.022) 
A, = exp(0.02254 . t /4 - 44.9738) 
Productivity of labor 
MPL, = (2/3)Y:/ L, 
Productivity of capital (4 to be annualized) 
MPK, = (4/3)Y:/K, 
Trend of capital productivityz8 
MPKT = 0.10 + (4/3)exp(-0.06447 . t/4 + 125.355) 
Trend of capital stockz9 
KT = [(3/4)A,/MPK,*I3” . L, 
Trend of consumer price level 
P: = (M,/Y:)exp(-0.03157 . t /4 + 67.0944) 
28. This is obtained by regressing log (MPK, - 0.10) on t so that MPK, and the real interest 
29. K,? is determined by the exogenous time trend alone. 
rate converge to 10 percent and 3.4 (= 10.0 - 6.6) percent, respectively. 
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Definition of the inflation rate 
IT, = log(P;/Pf-,) 
Definition of GDP 
I: = C,P + C;' + I, + XG, - MG, 
Regression Equations 
A lOg(Cr) = 0.26 . A lOg((1 - T , ) Y )  + 0.17 . A log(M,/pf) 
(8.09) (1.70) 
- 0.09 . [lOg(Cp_,/~-,)] - 0.06. 
(2.23) (2.27) 
A lOg(Z,) = - 0.31 . A log(Z,-,) + 0.26 . A log(XG,) + 0.29 . kb, 
(2.65) (1.98) (1.10) 
- 0.53 . (it - IT, - MPK,) - 0.30 . [lOg(K,-,/K,T,)] -0.28, 
(1.44) (1.34) (7.04) 
A log(XG,) = 0.30 . log(P!-, / P f - 2 )  
(2.33) 
- 0.16 . [log(XG,_,) - 3.04 . 10g(Y%,)] - 0.12. 
(2.1 1) (36.75) (9.73) 
Alog(MG,) = 0.21 . Alog(Z,) + 0.27 . Alog(Z,-,) 
(1.72) (2.32) 
+ 0.64 . AlOg(Cp + Cy)  + 0.17 . Alog(XG,) 
(0.83) (1.19) 
- 0.24 . log(e, . P : / P r )  - 0.15 . [log(MG,_,/XG,-,)] 
(1.83) (2.03) 
+ 1.67. 
(1.92) 
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i, = 0.79 . it-, + 0.02 . A log(Z,) - 0.12 . Alog(M,-,/Pf-,) 
(11.51) (1.5 1) (1.98) 
- 0.01 . log(M,-,/&) + 0.21 . [(T,-, + MPK,-, - 0.066)] 
(1.3 1) (3.03) 
+ 0.0002. 
(0.04) 
AlOg(y) = -0.34 . A lOg(y-,) + 0.35 . log(q/YT) 
(2.43) (3.34) 
- 0.05 . [lOg(y-,/P;-,) - ~o~(MPL,- , ) ]  + 0.36. 
(1.42) (1.3 1) 
Alog(P;) = 0.19 . Alog(Pp-,) + 0.09 . log(q/YT) 
(1.54) (3.39) 
- 0.07 . [lOg(P~.,/P~,)] + 0.02. 
(1.97) (1 1.07) 
A lOg(Pp) = 0.04 . A lOg(l+-, / MPL,-,) + 0.39 . A log(P;) 
(1.82) (4.01) 
+ 0.12 . A log(e, . P,") 
(4.23) 
- 0.09 . [log(Pp-,) - 0.26 . log(P;-,) - 0.74 . log(e,-, . P 3 1  
(2.49) (3.53) (13.53) 
- 0.004. 
(2.14) 
A log(P:) = 0.05 . A log(XG,) + 0.60 . A log(Pp/ e,) 
(2.26) (3.56) 
- 0.11 . [log(P:-,) - 0.85 . log(Pp-,/e,-,)] + 0.002. 
(1.37) (17.61) (0.73) 
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A lOg(P,M) = 0.46 . A log(P:) + 0.08 . A log(Pp) 
(3.02) (3.43) 
+ 0.40 . A log(Pp_,/ e,J - 0.17 
(2.50) (2.18) 
. [lOg(PE,) - 0.82 . lOg(P:_,) - 0.18 . l~g(pP_,)] 
(49.51) (1 0.74) 
- 0.001. 
(0.27) 
Seasonal dummies were included but are not reported. Numbers in parenthe- 
ses are t-statistics, and variables in brackets are error-correcting terms. 
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Comment Chong-Hyun Nam 
I find this paper very interesting. It is not only informative but also very useful, 
especially for policymakers in Korea. 
Chong-Hyun Nam is professor of economics at Korea University and a visiting scholar at the 
Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform at Stanford University. 
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As was much discussed in Black‘s paper (chap. 10 in this volume), a central 
important issue concerning capital market liberalization policy in Korea is 
whether there exists a trade-off between the speed of liberalization and the 
macroeconomic instabilities associated with it. Cho and Koh attempt to pro- 
vide a quantitative assessment of this issue by simulating the results of alterna- 
tive policy options, namely, a big bang approach, a gradual approach, and a 
gradual approach but with exchange rate targeting. 
However, they seem to fall short of presenting an explicit model with a de- 
tailed discussion, making it difficult to grasp the nature and workings of the 
model used in the simulations. Nevertheless, Cho and Koh produce some inter- 
esting empirical results from their exercises with alternative policy options, 
although they tend to be modest in making a priority judgment on those policy 
alternatives, mainly because they do not know the exact objective function of 
Korea’s policymakers. 
Though I do not know the exact objective function either, let me try to sug- 
gest a set of constraints under which Korea’s policymakers might work in rank- 
ing the policy alternatives open to them. I believe the first and most important 
factor for them to consider is the rate of economic growth. As a matter of fact, 
it has long been considered in Korea that anything less than a 7 percent eco- 
nomic growth rate is a sign of failure of both economic policy and political 
leadership. I presume that the 7 percent growth rate came from the thought 
that it provides a kind of bottom line that guarantees full employment with an 
ever increasing labor participation rate in Korea. 
A second factor that policymakers would take seriously is performance in 
export activities. No doubt, economic and export growth rates are highly corre- 
lated, but in Korea any economic growth without corresponding growth in ex- 
ports is generally believed to be at best transitory and not sustainable, mainly 
because domestic markets are thought too small to accommodate sustained 
growth. 
A third factor to be considered by policymakers would be the rate of infla- 
tion. As Korea becomes more integrated with the world economy, maintaining 
a stable price level has become more important. I think an upper tolerance limit 
for the inflation rate is around 5 percent per year at the moment, but it could 
go lower soon. 
A final factor that policymakers would take seriously is the rate of growth 
in external debt or the rate of accumulation of current account deficits. At the 
moment, the upper limit of tolerance in the policy-making circle seems to be 
2 percent of GNP, implying that net foreign capital inflow should be limited to 
less than 2 percent of GNP for an any particular year. 
Figures 11.4G (GDP growth rate), 11.41 (CPI growth rate), and 11.4K (capi- 
tal account balance) show that the least cost alternative is a gradual approach 
with no exchange rate targeting. 
But many questions remain as to the way the gradual approach is set up in 
the paper. A major issue may be that the time horizon for complete liberaliza- 
tion by the year 2010 seems a bit too long from both internal and external 
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points of view. As soon as Korea opens up its bonds markets to foreign inves- 
tors, the interest rate differential between home and abroad may quickly disap- 
pear not only because foreign buying of Korean bonds can be large but also 
because the interest elasticity with respect to capital account balance could 
increase significantly as Korea’s capital market becomes more efficient with 
ongoing liberalization. I also wonder whether Korea can delay its liberalization 
process of capital markets that long, because it embarks on joining the Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development soon. 
My final comment is that it would be nice if the authors could make experi- 
ments with the model for some more realistic policy packages that reflect, for 
instance, various levels of liberalization speed, of foreign exchange market 
intervention, and of sterilization. 
C O ~ ~ e n t  Koichi Hamada 
Cho and Koh’s paper contains a straightforward, simple experiment to assess 
the effect of possible “big bang” policies for Korea. The strengths of the paper 
are that the structure is simple and clearly exposited and that the experiment 
is easily related to theory. On the other hand, its weakness is that the model 
is too simple and is abstracted from many relevant factors. Accordingly, the 
computations from the experiment can only be remotely associated with ob- 
servable data. 
The paper presents an overshooting type of exchange rate determination 
model. It assumes some kind of short-run structure with price rigidity in con- 
nection to the Dornbusch dynamic and also a long-run full employment supply 
side. The relationship between these two aspects is not an easy problem. The 
authors do not provide such an explanation that they are related. For example, 
if the long-run income level is moving, the short-run overshooting process 
would be different because the money demand function would be shifting as 
well. 
Consider figure 11C. 1.  Graphically, the jumping path corresponding to the 
big bang where investors face different interest rates is like the solid line, while 
the path for the gradual process is something like the dotted arrows. 
On the empirical side, we are naturally curious about what is going on in 
the forward market. If we could obtain any information about forward rates or 
even their proxies, a discussion of interest rate arbitrage should follow. It would 
make the artificial discussion of approximation of the forward rate by actual 
Koichi Hamada is professor of economics at Yale University, 
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P (price) 
h = O  
Gradual Path 
0 
Fig. l lC. l  The big bang and gradualism 
e (exchange rate) 
exchange rates unnecessary. Then the structure of the model and the works of 
the internal arbitration exchange market would be much clearer. In summary, 
this paper has the feeling of an isolated theoretical experiment, somewhat aloof 
from the complexity of real economic situations.’ 
1. In retrospect, after the recent financial turmoil in Korea, I can now understand how drastic 
and difficult it was for the Korean economy to move from the state where there was no forward 
market to the state of convertibility, something close to the big bang experiment of this paper. 
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